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A few suggestions have been made as possible solutions to conflicts
between "other insurance" clauses. One is to extend the trend developing in California and Oregon, and to have courts ignore the
clauses and order proration in all cases.3" Another suggestion is to
have insurers draft standard forms that clearly state how they intend liability to be apportioned when "other insurance" clauses conflict. One commentator places a large part of the blame for the increasing litigation in this area on the insurance industry for their
inaction." A legislative solution has been proposed which would generally outlaw escape and modified escape clauses, limit the use of
excess clauses, and favor the pro rata clause. 2
In any case, it should be made certain that the insured will not
receive less coverage than if he were protected by only one policy.
The coincidence of having two policies covering the same loss should
not cause a "forfeiture" but simply present the issue of apportionment.33 The principal case indicates that the Washington court does
not favor wholesale proration, but will continue fixing responsibility
on one insurer or the other in appropriate cases.

QUASI-CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY WHEN MUNICIPAL
CONTRACT ULTRA VIRES
While plaintiff's shopping center was under construction, defendant
second-class municipality prepared for installation of a stop light to
aid traffic going to and from the center. A contractor was hired and
the design was approved, but funds were not budgeted for the project.
With the shopping center nearing completion, it was agreed that plaintiff would pay the cost of installation and defendant city would reimburse him out of the following year's budget. The city, without calling
for bids on the contract, hired a contractor and plaintiff paid the
cost of the traffic signal and its installation. In plaintiff's suit on
Though the reasoning may be criticized as circular and arbitrary, we believe
the better rule is that where the insurance companies would be both liable except
for the other, the excess-escape clause policy should be held to be not other
similar insurance to the policy containing the pro rata clause, conversely, the

policy with only its pro rata clause applicable is regarded as other similar insurance as used in the excess-escape policy.

'See Note, 38 IfiNN. L. REv. 838 (1954) ; Note, 1 WILLAmETmE L.J. 485 (1961).
" Note, 65 COLUTm. L. Rv. 319, 331-32 (1965).
"Russ, The Double Insurance Problenz--A Proposal,13 HASTINGs L.J. 183, 191-93
(1961).
' Note, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 319, 321 (1965).
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the reimbursement contract, the trial court held the contract void
and unenforceable because the method of formation contravened statutes prohibiting a municipality from borrowing unappropriated funds,'
and letting contracts without a call for bids; 2 however, plaintiff was
allowed recovery on unjust enrichment principles for the value of the
benefits conferred. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court modified the decree, and held: Violation of statutory municipal budgeting
and bidding requirements renders a municipal contract void, but plaintiff may recover in quasi-contract the reasonable value of the improvement when the improvement retained by the city is within the
authority of the city to provide. Edwards v. Renton, 67 Wash. Dec.
2d 586,409 P.2d 153 (1965).
No recovery will be allowed on an express municipal contract which
is formed without observing the mandatory legal requirements specifi3
cally regulating the mode by which municipal power is to be exercised.
However, liability of municipal corporations in quasi-contract for benefits received under an ultra vires agreement 4 has gained recognition in
several jurisdictions.5 On one hand, public policy demands that a muWAsn. REV. CODE § 35.33.120 (1963) provides:
The expenditures as classified and itemized in the final budget shall constitute
the city's appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year. Every officer and employee
of the city shall be limited in the making of expenditures and incurring of
liabilities to the amounts of the detailed appropriations items or classes....
Liabilities incurred by any officer or employee of the city in excess of any
budget appropriation shall not be a liability of the city.
- WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.23.352 (1963) provides:
Whenever the [estimated] cost of [a] public work or improvement, including
materials, supplies and equipment, will exceed five thousand dollars, the same
shall be done by contract after a call for bids which shall be awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder.
'See, e.g., Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 Pac. 226 (1910); 10
McQuLL- r, MUNICIPAL Co,'oATIoNs § 29.02 (3d ed. 1950).
'The term "ultra vires," as applied to a municipal corporation, has two distinct
meanings: (1) Where the municipality has acted beyond its power altogether and
is not legally capable of accepting the benefits, and (2) where the municipality has
the power to achieve the end, and thus accept the benefits, but has acted beyond its
statutory authority in the means of reaching the end. Compare the majority and
dissenting opinions in Abrams v. City of Seattle, 173 Wash. 495, 23 P.2d 869 (1933).
See generally Note, 34 MINN. L. REv. 46 (1949). It is in the latter sense that "ultra
vires" is used in the principal case, as applied to the manner in which defendant
city obtained funds for the traffic signal.
'Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9, 43 So. 2d 18 (1949), 24 TUL. L. REv. 363
(1950) ; Hudson City Contracting Co. v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 17 N.J.
297, 111 A.2d 385 (1955), 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 591; Slauder v. San Antonio, 2 S.W.2d
841 (Tex. 1928).
The leading case denying quasi-contractual recovery is Zottman v. City & County
of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96, 81 Am. Dec. 96 (1862). Accord, City of Detroit v.
Michigan Paving Co., 36 Mich. 335 (1877); Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell,
60 Ohio St. 406, 54 N.E. 372 (1899) ; Burgess v. City of Cameron, 113 W. Va. 127,
166 S.E. 113 (1932), 39 W. VA. L. REv. 185; Probst v. City of Menasha, 245 Wis.
90, 13 N.W.2d 504 (1944), 29 MA q. L. REv. 70 (1945).
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nicipal government remain strictly within the bounds of its delegated
authority; 6 on the other, unjust enrichment and fair dealing require
that a city should not be permitted to receive the benefit of money,
property, or services without paying just compensation.7 The principal
case illustrates an attempted reconciliation of these conflicting principles.
The court in the principal case found that Washington had adopted
the equitable rule allowing quasi-contractual recovery on a municipal
contract which the city has power to make, although the means of
exercising that power are ultra vires.8 The equitable notion that a
municipality must be held "to the same standard of right and wrong
that the law imposes upon individuals" 9 was found to outweigh the
principle that a person dealing with a municipality is chargeable with
knowledge of its restricted authority."° Further, while recognizing
that quasi-contractual recovery is generally limited to the value of the
actual benefit conferred,"' the court interpreted prior decisions to
compel awarding plaintiff the reasonable value of the improvement
supplied' 2 -the liability that would have been imposed on the city
had the budget and bid statutes been properly followed.
'See

Knowlton, The Quasi-Contractual Obligations of Municipal Corporations,

9 MicH. L. REv. 671 (1911).

'See Antieau, The Contractual and Quasi-ContractualResponsibilities of MunicipalCorporations,2 ST. Louis L. REv. 230, 237-38 (1953).
'Abrams v. City of Seattle, 173 Wash. 495, 23 P.2d 869 (1933) (city liable for
reasonable value of improvements made under a void lease agreement) ; O'Connor v.
Murray, 152 Wash. 519, 278 Pac. 176 (1929) (road contractor entitled to reasonable
value of work although a commissioner was beneficially interested in contract);
Besoloff v. Whatcom County, 133 Wash. 109, 233 Pac. 284 (1925) (road contractor
may recover reasonable value of work where contract let without a call for bids);
Mallory v. City of Olympia, 83 Wash. 499, 145 Pac. 627 (1915) (city liable for the
value of the labor and property it receives under a substantially performed contract) ;
Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 Pac. 226 (1910)) (city liable for funds
paid out on a contract despite failure to observe the bidding requirements).
' 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 592, 409 P.2d at 158, quoting from Mallory v. City of Olympia, 83 Wash. 499, 505, 145 Pac. 627, 629 (1915).
"0Stoddard v. King County, 22 Wn. 2d 868, 158 P.2d 78 (1945); Brougham v.
City of Seattle, 194 Wash. 1, 76 P.2d 1013 (1938). But see Antieau, supra note 7, at
238:
With hundreds and hundreds of cases every year litigating the existence of
particular powers of municipal corporations and with the typical city attorney
himself in considerable doubt as to the existence of many municipal powers,
is it fair to impose, upon a private party who would serve the city, the requirement of exact knowledge of the extent of municipal power? It is suggested that
it is not.
'See Owens v. Floyd County, 94 Ga. App. 532, 95 S.E.2d 389 (1956) ; Luther v.
Wheeler, 75 S.C. 83, 52 S.E. 874 (1905).
Citing Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 Pac. 226 (1910), where
the court, without discussion, allowed recovery for the reasonable value of the
property received. But see Kruesel v. Collin, 170 Wash. 233, 239, 16 P.2d 442, 444
(1932) (dictum), where the court stated that, if a city borrows money in violation
of the budgeting statute, "in ascertaining the quantum of liability the amount of
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Several previous Washington cases have held that a municipality
will be liable on unjust enrichment principles for failing to observe
the municipal bidding statute. 1 3 However, holding that a creditor
may recover in quasi-contract on an agreement which effectively circumvents the budgeting statute, notwithstanding the statute's specific
declaration that such a liability "shall not be a liability of the city,"' 4
does represent an extension of, if not a complete departure from,
earlier decisions. Although no Washington case has specifically discussed the issue, in Hailey v. King County'" an employee was denied
recovery for the value of his services when his salary was not budgeted for the year in which he worked. The court held that personal
services did not fall within the scope of unjust enrichment principles
insofar as they apply to municipal corporations.'" The court in the
principal case was willing to allow recovery up to the value the city
otherwise would have paid had the budgeting and bidding statutes
been properly utilized. The scope of the rule would certainly seem
to include personal services rendered. The court in the principal
case indicated that quasi-contractual recovery would not be permitted
17
if the objectionable acts were "manifestly violative of public policy.'
Thus, the justification for such recovery, despite the ultra vires nature
of the acts of the municipal government, must rest on an examination
of the public policies being served by the specific statutes.' Generally,
the loan is not taken into account, but the measure of recovery is the money actually
applied to lawful municipal or county uses," quoting from Butts County v. Jackson
Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S.E. 149, 152 (1908).
Banking
' 3 Besoloff v. Whatcom County, 133 Wash. 109, 233 Pac. 284 (1925); Green v.
Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 Pac. 226 (1910). But see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 62, comment b at 242 (1937).
, WASH. REV. CODE § 35.33.120 (1963).
' 21 Wn. 2d 53, 149 P.2d 823, 154 A.L.R. 351 (1944).
The court in Hailey spoke in terms of "implied contract," and it is not clear
whether the court was referring to contracts implied in fact or implied in law. For
a discussion of the distinction between implied in fact contracts and quasi-contracts,

and its significance, see Antieau, sup~ra note 7, at 230-35;
§ 5, comment a at 7 (1932).

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 591, 409 P.2d at 157. The majority rule, denying quasicontractual recovery in all situations involving ultra vires acts of a city, rests on the
fear of local governments exceeding their authority through fraud, collusion, or
favoritism. See Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 323, 111 Pac. 226, 231
(1910) (Rudkin, C. J., dissenting) :
It is presuming entirely too much in favor of weak human nature to assume that
the delinquent officials will be overdiligent or overzealous in proving that their
unauthorized contract was improvidently or fraudulently entered into.
The court in the principal case attempted to rectify this problem by keeping a
judicial eye open for possible signs of fraud or collusion. Such judicial policing
seems inadequate if the trial court is confined to the record before it. A possible
solution may be the mandatory joinder of a third party, such as the Attorney General,
to protect the public's interest in a proper distribution of municipal funds.
'See Note, 34 MINN. L. REv. 46, 47-48 (1949). Some courts allow quasicontractual relief where the statute is "directory," but deny relief where the statute
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the purpose of a municipal bidding requirement is to insure the public
of proper disposition of the tax dollar. 9 This end will be achieved
by limiting recovery to the expense which the city would have incurred had the bidding requirement been observed.2 °
On the other hand, the propriety of allowing quasi-contractual recovery after the non-observance of a municipal budgeting requirement
is questionable. If the purpose of such a statute is "to inculcate sound
business principles and practices into the municipal economy,"'" allowing recovery on a contract implied in law certainly appears to defeat the legislative policy. In theory, however, the city is not held
liable on the contractual obligation; rather, quasi-contractual liability
is a judicially-imposed obligation for benefits the city has received by
its own extra-legal behavior.2 2 Thus, holding a city liable on a contract
implied on law appears closely analogous to the recent demise of
municipal immunity on the tort area;2 3 in both instances the courts are
endeavoring "to hold municipalities to the same standard of right and
wrong that the law imposes upon individuals." 4

is "mandatory." See, e.g., Hines v. City of Bellefontaine, 74 Ohio App. 393, 57
N.E.2d 164 (1944). For a criticism of this approach see Tooke, Quasi-Contractual
Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47 HAv. L. REV. 1143, 1161-64 (1934). Fortunately, the Washing-ton court has avoided this quagmire. See also Antieau, sunpra
note 7, at 249, 250:
[W]hether recovery should be possible in contract or in quasi-contract demands
not a mechanical retreat to [directory-mandatory] labels but a judicially conscious awareness and weighing of the social purpose underlying the statute, the
persons intended to be protected thereby, the degree of deception or bad faith of
municipal agents and officers in the particular trading, the extent of culpable
carelessness on the part of the private contractor, the possibilities of restoration
to the status quo, and, in general, the chance of honoring worthy private claims
without making a mockery of the applicable statute.
Edwards v. City of Renton, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 586, 590, 409 P.2d 153, 157 (1965).
See generally 1 ANTIEAU, Muuicnu. CORPORATION LAW § 10.11, at 690 (1965) ; 10
MCQUILLIN, op. cit supra note 3, § 29.29.
£ See Antieau, supra note 7, at 250; Note, 34 MINN. L. REV. 46, 48-50 (1949).
a Edwards v. City of Renton, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 586, 590, 409 P.2d 153, 157 (1965).
See generally 2 ANTMAU, op. cit. supra note 19, § 15.31, at 453; 15 MCQUILLIN, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 39.39, at 125.
'See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 19 (1950); RESTATEMSENT, RESTITUTION, § 5, comment a at 22 (1937).
'See, e.g., Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wn. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964), 39 WAsH.
L. R . 275; Comment, Abolition of Sovereign Inmmnity in Washington, 36 Wash.
L. REv. 312 (1961) ; PROssER, TORTS § 125, 1010-13 (3d ed. 1964).
2'67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 592, 409 P.2d at 158; cf. cases cited note 9 supra.

